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Introduction 
 
It is a widely held view amongst psychologists that human beings have a basic need to 
create a positive social identity for themselves, either as individuals or as members of 
a group.
1
 In this regard, choice of dress is likely to be particularly important.
2
 A 
person‟s clothes can reveal much about their identity, in relation to their gender,3 
class,
4
 sexual orientation,
5
 and religious beliefs.
6
 But what an individual wears can 
also attract great controversy, as evidenced by the fact that, in Europe of late, there 
have been few issues more controversial than that of religious dress.
7
  
 
Today in towns and cities across Europe a significant proportion of Muslims − in 
particular Muslim females
8
 − have eschewed conventional western clothes in favour 
of garments (such as veils and headscarves) traditionally associated with Islam.
9
 With 
a new generation of „European Muslims‟ keen to cultivate a distinct identity for 
themselves as members of the continent‟s second largest religion,10 Islamic dress 
often has an “emblematic status”,11 in that it is a “powerful and overdetermined 
marker of difference”.12 Yet the right to wear religious dress varies significantly in 
                                                 
1
. For example, see Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict”, in 
W. Austin and S. Worchel (eds.) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Brooks-Cole, 1979) 
pp.33-48. 
2
. See Fred Davis, Fashion, Culture, and Identity (University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
3
. See Kimberly Huisman and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, “Dress Matters. Change and Continuity in 
the Dress Practices of Bosnian Muslim Refugee Women” (2005) 19(1) Gender & Society, 44-65. 
4
. See Diana Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing 
(University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
5
. See Kate Schofield and Ruth Schmidt, “Fashion and clothing: the construction and communication of 
gay identities” (2005) 33(4) International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 310-323. 
6
. See Stephen Bigger, “Muslim women‟s views on dress code and the hijaab: some issues for 
education”, (2006) 27(2) Journal of Beliefs and Values, 215-226. 
7
. See Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe 
(Hart, 2006). 
8
. Whilst religious dress is most commonly associated with female Islamic identity, it should not be 
forgotten that dress also influences the lives of young Muslim men. See Peter Hopkins, “Young 
Muslim Men in Scotland: Inclusions and Exclusions” (2004) 2(2) Children’s Geographies, 262. 
9. Whilst Islamic dress clearly conveys a woman‟s religious identity, it can also convey her cultural and 
ethnic identity. See Claire Dwyer, “Contradictions of Community: questions of identity for British 
Muslim women” (1999) 31 Environment and Planning A, 53-68. 
10
. See Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context 
(Islamic Foundation, 1999) and Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 
Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: a European approach (Routledge, 2006). 
11
. Myfanwy Franks, “Crossing the borders of whiteness? White Muslim women who wear the hijab in 
Britain today” (2000) 23(5) Ethnic and Racial Studies, 920. 
12
. Claire Dwyer, “Veiled Meanings: Young British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of 
Difference” (1999) 6(1) Gender, Place and Culture, 5. 
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Europe.
13
 In some countries there are clear restrictions on what can (or cannot) be 
worn in public (eg., France and Turkey) whereas in other parts of the continent (eg., 
the UK) young people are relatively free to wear the religious dress of their choice.
14
 
Mindful of this state of affairs, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen to 
tread warily, letting governments retain considerable discretion in the field of 
religious dress. As a consequence, states enjoy a wide „margin of appreciation‟ when 
it comes to determining whether their curbs on religious symbols or related garments 
are compatible with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
15
 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief (Asma Jahangir) has 
distinguished between situations where people are compelled by the state to adhere to 
certain dress codes (eg., Jews forced to wear the star of David under the Nazis) and 
those where the state forbids certain forms of religious dress.
16
 Instances of the former 
have, at least in Europe, been confined to the dustbin of history, so for the purposes of 
this article we focus on the latter – the extent to which the state is permitted under the 
ECHR to impose restrictions on garments associated with religious beliefs.
17
  
 
We suggest that the guiding principle in such matters ought to be personal 
autonomy,
18
 although we accept that the interests of the state may justify the 
imposition of curbs on religious dress in certain (albeit limited) occasions.
19
 Our main 
concern is that, in relation to its jurisprudence on religious dress under Article 9 of the 
ECHR, the European Court has failed to subject the actions of states to sufficient 
scrutiny. As a consequence groups such as Muslims, for whom certain garments are 
often of great symbolic importance, tend to be greatly disadvantaged, especially so in 
European nations with a secular tradition. It is thus our central contention that, with an 
increasing number of Europe‟s Muslims‟ evidently choosing to demonstrate a 
commitment to their faith by the clothes they wear, the European Court should be 
more sensitive to this particular form of manifesting religion or belief. 
 
The article is divided into four parts. We begin by discussing some of the reasons why 
Islamic dress tends to be so controversial. We then examine the approach of the 
European Court (and Commission) of Human Rights to garments and symbols 
associated with religion and belief under Article 9 of the ECHR. We proceed to 
consider some of the challenges of accommodating Islamic dress under the European 
Convention. And finally, we explore the relationship between freedom to wear 
religious dress and certain liberal values related to democracy.  
                                                 
13
. See W. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld, Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf 
(2005) 16(1) Journal of Islamic Studies, 35-61. 
14. See Sebastian Poulter, “Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting legal approaches in England 
and France” (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43-74. 
15
. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 
1950, Art. 9(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. 
16
. See UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.4. March 8, 2006, para.36. 
17. The Special Rapporteur refers to this as „positive freedom of religion or belief‟: Asma Jahangir, 
E/CN.4/2006/5, 9 January 2006, para.36. 
18. It should, however, not be forgotten a person‟s freedom to wear the garments of their choice may be 
constrained by cultural or social pressures (eg., notions of modesty, honour and shame). See Claire 
Alexander, The Asian Gang: Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity (Berg, 2000). 
19
. See Art. 9(2) of the ECHR (1950); Art. 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966); and Art. 14(3) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
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1. Controversy and Islamic dress 
 
There are few things more capable of generating controversy in contemporary Europe 
than the Islamic headscarf.
20
 What for some is just a piece of cloth worn as a positive 
declaration of faith is, for others, a sinister public statement that may even (in certain 
places) constitute a threat to the very organs of the state.
21
 It is suggested that there 
are at least three reasons why Islamic dress tends to attract controversy in 
contemporary Europe.  
 
First, Islamic dress has been commonly perceived (at least in the west) as being 
associated with the subordination of young girls and women.
22
 That said, many 
commentators reject any such a characterisation,
23
 and argue that the choice of 
Muslim women in the west to wear what has been termed the „new veil‟ is now the 
„most conspicuous sign of Islamic feminism‟.24 International human rights law clearly 
forbids discrimination or unfavourable treatment on the ground of one‟s sex,25 yet 
such considerations aside, there is little consensus as to whether forms of Islamic 
dress embolden or disempower Muslim women.
26
  
 
A second reason why Muslim dress often generates controversy is because of a 
perceived link between certain items of clothing and what is commonly termed 
“Islamic fundamentalism”.27 For example, garments such as the burka (which 
typically conceals the wearer‟s entire body) are associated with the excesses of 
totalitarian theocracies,
28
 and senior UN office holders continue to criticise the actions 
of governments that impose strict religious dress codes on women in some Muslim 
nations.
29
 In contrast, the state has placed restrictions on religious dress in Turkey, the 
home of Europe‟s largest Muslim population, in an effort to counter a perceived threat 
                                                 
20. We use the term “headscarf” in this article to mean the Islamic headscarf which covers the hair and 
neck. The term hijab is often used as a synonym for Islamic headscarf, but we use it here to denote 
Islamic dress more generally. In the Qur‟an “hijab” is used to refer to the “spatial curtain that divides 
or provides privacy”: see G. Anwar and L. McKay, “Veiling” in Richard Martin (ed) Encyclopedia Of 
Islam and the Muslim World (Macmillan, 2004) p.721. 
21
. See Alev Çinar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (University 
of Minnesota, 2005) pp.53-98.  
22
. See, generally, Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (Yale University Press, 1992). 
23
. See Lama Abu-Odeh, “Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering the Differences” (1992) 
New Eng. L. Rev. 1527, and Riffat Hassan, “Rights of Women within Islamic Communities”, in  Johan 
van der Vyver and John Witte Jr. (eds), Religious Rights in Global Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1996) p.361. 
24
. Dawn Lyon and Deborah Spini, “Unveiling the Headscarf debate” (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 
344. 
25
. See The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 
Dec.18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc A/34/46, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force 3 Sept 1981)]. 
26. On claims that „fundamentalist‟ religions seek to control women more generally see Nira Yuval-
Davis, “Fundamentalism, Multiculturalism and Women in Britain”, in James Donald and Ali Rattansi 
(eds) ‘Race’, Culture and Difference (Sage, 1992) pp.278-291. 
27
. See Youssef Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Continuum International, 2002). 
28
. See Rosemarie Skaine, The Women of Afghanistan under the Taliban (McFarland, 2002) pp. 61-85. 
29
. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (Asma Jahangir) 
E/CN.4/2006/5, 9 January 2006, para.38.  
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of radical Islamism.
30
 As will be seen in more detail (below), the European Court of 
Human Rights − in response to claims that the headscarf is a “symbol of a political 
Islam [that] threatens to cause civil unrest”31 − has been prepared to acknowledge a 
link between the Islamic headscarf and „extremist political movements‟ in Turkey.32 
 
Thirdly, Muslim dress is often controversial because it highlights an important 
difference between the Islamic and secular liberal traditions − the role of faith in 
public life. In Islam there is no clear distinction between the public and private 
aspects of a person‟s existence,33 whereas in western „secular‟ nations, religion is 
typically confined to the „private‟ rather than the „public‟ sphere.34 The significance 
of this difference is illustrated by the opposition from Muslims to the introduction of a 
French law in 2004, banning the display of „conspicuous‟ religious symbols from the 
classrooms of all public schools.
35
 The law was an important reaffirmation of the 
French nation‟s commitment to „laïcité − the principle that religion is fundamentally 
incompatible with the institutions of the secular French Republic, and that the public 
manifestation of one‟s beliefs should be confined to the private rather than public 
sphere.
36
 Yet such private/public distinctions are anathema to many young Muslims − 
and their rejection of the view that displays of faith in the form of the headscarf 
should be confined to the private arena lies at the very heart of their opposition to the 
French law.
37
 
 
Although the French law on „conspicuous‟ religious symbols continues to remain in 
force, it has attracted widespread international criticism.
38
 Indeed, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Religion or Belief (Asma Jahangir) has claimed that the French law not 
merely sends “a demoralizing message to religious minorities in France”, but that it 
also “appears to target girls from a Muslim background wearing the headscarf”.39 The 
right to manifest one‟s religion or belief in the clothes of one‟s choice is clearly not an 
absolute right,
40
 but the Special Rapporteur has said that any such restriction must be: 
 
 “based on the grounds of public safety, order, health, or morals, or the 
 fundamental rights and freedoms of others, it must respond to pressing public 
                                                 
30
. See Özlem Denli, “Between laicist state ideology and modern public religion: the head-cover 
controversy in contemporary Turkey”, in Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham Jr, Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie 
(eds) Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Desktop (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) p.498. 
31
. Şahin v. Turkey 44 Eur.H.R.Rep. 5, para.115 (G.C.) (2007). 
32
. Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31. 
33
. See Aezular Rahman, Islam, Ideology and The Way of Life (Muslim Schools Trust, 1980). 
34
. See Roger Trigg, Religion in Public Life. Must Faith Be Privatised? (OUP, 2007). 
35
. Law No. 2004-228, of 15
th
 March 2004. 
36
. For example see Jane Freeman, “Secularism as a barrier to integration − the French dilemma”, 
(2004) 42(3) International Migration 5. 
37. See Dominique Malliard, “The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration” (2005) 
16(1) Mediterranean Quarterly, 62. 
38
. For example, see European Parliament, Written Declaration, February 20, 2004, DC\524428EN.doc, 
and Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of 
France, 4 June 2004, 36th session, CRC/C/15/Add.240, paras 25 and 26. 
39
. Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (Asma Jahangir), Mission to 
France, E /CN.4/2006/5/Add.4, 8 March 2006, paras 98-100. 
40
. See supra, n 19. 
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 or social need, it must be pursue a legitimate aim and it must be proportionate 
 to that aim.”
41
 
 
It is perhaps no great coincidence that these criteria are very similar to those 
governing religious dress under Article 9 of the ECHR, and it is to this provision of 
the Convention that we now turn. 
 
 
2. Article 9 of the ECHR:  religious dress and related symbols  
 
Article 9 of the ECHR provides that: 
 
(1) “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one‟s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law, and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”42 
 
There are two elements to Article 9(1). First, it has an „internal‟ dimension (forum 
internum) which guarantees „freedom of thought, conscience and religion‟, and these 
are rights (eg., one‟s private thoughts) that must not be restricted.43 And secondly, 
Article 9(1) has an „external‟ element (forum externum) whereby it recognises that 
everyone has the right to manifest a “religion or belief” in “worship, teaching, 
practice and observance”. Under Article 9(2), the state may (however) impose 
restrictions on such manifestations of religion or belief, as long as they are: 
“prescribed by law”; in pursuance of a legitimate aim (ie., public safety, public order, 
health, morals, and protection of the rights and freedom of others); and “necessary in 
a democratic society”. This last phrase has been interpreted as meaning that any 
limitation on religious freedom must be proportionate to the aim which the state 
wishes to achieve.
44
 In assessing the proportionality of a state‟s restriction on the 
manifestation of religion or belief, the Court has tended to grant states considerable 
latitude (a wide margin of appreciation) in politically sensitive areas where there is 
little pan-European consensus, such as the protection of morals
45
 and freedom of 
religion.
46
 On such matters the European Court has tended to acknowledge that the 
                                                 
41
. Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (Asma Jahangir), E/CN.4/2006/5, 
9 January 2006, para.53. 
42
. On Article 9 of the ECHR generally see Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2001). 
43
. Darby v Sweden A 187 (1991) Com Rep, para.44.  
44
. See, for example, Larissis v. Greece, 27 Eur.H.R.Rep. 329, para.46 (1999). 
45
. See, for example, Handyside v. U.K. 1 Eur.H.R.Rep. 737 (1979-80). 
46
. See, for example, Wingrove v. U.K. 24 Eur.H.R.Rep. 1 para.58 (1996) and Murphy v. Ireland 38 
Eur.H.R.Rep. 13, para.67 (2004).  
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state is better placed than an international tribunal to assess whether restrictions are 
“necessary in a democratic society”.47 
 
In common with many other rights in the ECHR, Article 9 allows for a balance to be 
struck between the rights of the individual and competing societal aims.
48
 However, it 
could be argued that, in respect of Article 9 and the issue of religious dress, a fair 
balance has rarely been struck. There are at least two reasons for this: (i) the fact that 
certain religions may be disadvantaged by the structure of Article 9, particularly in 
relation to distinctions between the manifestation of faith in the public and private 
spheres; and (ii) the narrow interpretation of Article 9 by the European Court (and 
Commission) of Human Rights as regards the issue of religious dress. 
 
 
(i) The structure of Article 9: public and private spheres 
 
As noted above, under Article 9 of the ECHR, the forum internum (the internal 
sphere) of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, has absolute protection, 
whereas the manifestation of one‟s religion or belief may be restricted under Article 
9(2). Accordingly, privately held beliefs are untouchable, but once they emerge into 
the open (ie., once they are made manifest), the state is entitled to impose restrictions, 
subject to the “legitimate aim”, “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic 
society” criteria. This distinction has obvious consequences for the devotee of a 
particular religion who considers him/herself duty bound by the tenets of their faith to 
manifest their faith by wearing a particular form of dress, since it is only at this point 
that the limitations permitted by Article 9(2) come into play.  
 
It has been argued by some commentators that this split between the forum internum 
and the forum externum has the effect of favouring post-Reformation Protestant 
Christianity, which places more emphasis on the internal holding of faith than the 
outward display of it.
49
 Indeed, one of the central debates of the European 
Reformation in the sixteenth century was over whether the soul could be saved purely 
by virtue of a person‟s (internally held) belief, or whether it was also necessary to 
perform good works:  
 
“[Martin] Luther held that man was justified (saved) by faith alone: the 
words sola fide came to be the watchword and touchstone of the 
Reformation.  Man could do nothing by his own works – whether 
works of edification like prayer, fasting, mortification, or works of 
charity – to compel justification.  But if he believed, God of His grace 
would give him the gifts of the Holy Spirit – salvation and eternal 
life.”50 
 
                                                 
47
. See Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002). 
48
. The other ECHR articles which follow this two paragraph structure are Article 8 (respect for private 
and family life, home and correspondence, Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (peaceful 
assembly and association). 
49
. See Peter Edge and Graham Harvey, “Introduction”, in Peter Edge and Graham Harvey (eds) Law 
and Religion in Contemporary Society, (Ashgate, 2000) pp.7-8. 
50
. Geoffrey Elton, Reformation Europe 1517–1559 (Fontana 1963), p.16. See also Patrick Collinson, 
The Reformation, (Phoenix 2005) pp.47-9.   
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Luther‟s influence meant that the emphasis on outward symbolism and ritual was 
significantly reduced in post-Reformation Protestant Christianity.
51
 Moreover, it is 
also important not to ignore the impact of the Enlightenment in this regard.  
 
One of the themes within the European Enlightenment in the eighteenth century − 
especially in Immanuel Kant‟s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone − was an 
attempt to reformulate religion on a more rational basis, placing less emphasis on the 
literal meaning of texts and the practices that those texts apparently required.
52
 As 
Saba Mahmood puts it, Kant argued that: 
 
“[P]henomenal forms of religion are a left over from the infancy of the 
human race, when man needed such aids, and should be discarded 
when the human species has reached the appropriate level of maturity.  
For [him] the value of scripture lay not in its temporal narrative but in 
the rational structure it symbolized.”53  
 
It is thus perhaps no surprise that human rights law, with its origins in Enlightenment 
thought, should place less value on the outward manifestations of religious belief than 
the internal holding of such belief.
54
 
 
Contemporary human rights norms may have been heavily influenced by post-
Reformation Protestant Christianity,
55
 but one cannot ignore the fact that, in contrast 
to Protestant Christianity, many other faiths place great emphasis on external forms of 
observance, symbols and ritual. From Jewish yarmulkes and Sikh turbans to Muslim 
veils and Catholic crosses, the distinctive personality of each group is often 
maintained by what is worn or displayed in public. On the global level, there is thus a 
close association between the physical manifestation of a person‟s faith and his/her 
dress.
56
 In contrast, however, it would appear the European Court of Human Rights 
has yet to take full cognisance of this fact, given the conservative way in which 
Article 9 has been interpreted in relation to state imposed curbs on religious dress. 
 
 
(ii) Article 9, ECHR jurisprudence, and religious dress 
 
In view of the European Court‟s acknowledgment that freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion is “one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
                                                 
51
. Collinson, supra, n 50, at pp.155-171. 
52
. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (eds. & trans, Harper and Row, 1960), Immanuel Kant, 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), pp.100–105. See also Paul Hyland, Olga Gomez 
and Francesca Greensides (eds) The Enlightenment (Routledge, 2003). 
53
. Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics and Empire: the politics of the Islamic Reformation”, 
18(2) Public Culture at 342. 
54
. On the contribution of the Enlightenment to contemporary human rights norms generally see M. 
Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (University of 
California Press, 2004) pp.63-66. 
55
 See Michael Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Non-Religious Ground? (2005) 27 Dublin 
University Law Journal 28, 50. 
56
. For example, see General Comment 22, on Article 18 of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, UN 
Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 48th session, July 20, 1993, para.4; Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan 
(931/00) CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000; and Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 
belief (Asma Jahangir), E/CN.4/2006/5, 9 January 2006, para.36. 
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believers and their conception of life,”57 it is perhaps unsurprising that Article 9 has 
often been invoked in respect of limitations on religious dress. From challenges to 
prison dress codes,
58
 to Sikh motorcyclists objecting to laws requiring them to replace 
their turbans with crash-helmets,
59
 such cases were traditionally disposed of quickly 
and unsympathetically by the (now defunct) European Commission of Human 
Rights.
60
 
 
The Commission also interpreted Article 9 narrowly in relation to state sanctioned 
curbs on the Islamic headscarf in Turkey. For example, in Karaduman v. Turkey, a 
student who had successfully completed her studies at Ankara University was refused 
a degree certificate because of her unwillingness to provide a photograph of herself in 
which she was not wearing an Islamic headscarf.
 61
 Her claim of a breach of Article 9 
was rejected on the basis that there had been no interference with Article 9. The 
Commission considered it relevant that the applicant had “chosen” to attend a secular 
university, and that this “naturally” implied her acquiescence in certain rules 
established to preserve the secular nature of the institution and the peaceful 
coexistence between students of different beliefs.
62
 Moreover, the Commission held 
that “having regard to the requirements of secular university system [the regulation of 
a student‟s dress did] not as such constitute an interference with [their] freedom of 
religion and conscience”.63 Thus, the University‟s refusal to award the applicant a 
degree certificate had not contravened Article 9(1) and, because of this narrow 
interpretation, it was unnecessary to consider the permissibility of the state‟s dress 
restrictions under Article 9(2). 
 
The issue of religious dress was again considered in Dahlab v. Switzerland,
64
 where a 
Swiss primary school teacher, who had converted to Islam, was prevented from 
wearing a Muslim headscarf in class. The applicant (Dahlab) challenged the ban as 
being an unlawful restriction on her religious freedom. The European Court accepted 
that there had been an interference with Article 9(1) of the ECHR, but ruled that the 
state‟s actions were justified under Article 9(2). In reaching this conclusion the 
Strasbourg judges reasoned that, in view of the denominational neutrality of the Swiss 
education system, the “tender age” of the pupils concerned, and the margin of 
appreciation in matters of religion, the ban on Dahlab wearing a Muslim headscarf 
was proportionate and thereby “necessary in [Switzerland‟s] democratic society”.  
 
It was the European Court‟s more general comments about the headscarf in this case 
which perhaps betray its latent suspicion of Islamic dress. The Court suggested that 
the applicant‟s decision to wear the headscarf in the classroom “might have some kind 
of proselytising effect” and added that it was “difficult to reconcile the wearing of an 
Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, 
                                                 
57
. Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397, para.31. 
58
. See X v Austria, App. No. 1753/63, 15 February 1965, Yearbook 8, 174. 
59
. See X v UK, App. No. 7992/77 (1978), 14 D+R 234. 
60
. The Commission was abolished by Protocol 11, which came into force in 1998 and allowed 
individuals to take cases directly to a newly reformed European Court of Human Rights. See Robin 
White and Clare Ovey, Jacobs and White, European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2006) pp.8-
11. 
61
. Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 DR 93 (1993). 
62
. Id, at para.108. 
63
. Id at para.109. 
64
. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001, 2001-V. 
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equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey 
to their pupils.”65 The Court‟s ruling in Dahlab has, perhaps unsurprisingly, provoked 
widespread unfavourable comment.
66
 At the very least it can be criticised on at least 
four grounds. First, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the danger that the 
headscarf might have a “proselytising effect” yet, on the facts of the case, the school‟s 
inspector admitted to having received no complaints from parents about Dahlab‟s 
decision to wear Islamic dress in the classroom. Secondly, although there is an 
implicit suggestion in the European Court‟s judgment of an association between the 
Islamic headscarf and militant forms of Islam, there was no evidence of the applicant 
having a political agenda, and even the Swiss Federal Court accepted that she only 
wished to wear the headscarf “in order to obey a religious precept”. Thirdly, it is 
perhaps surprising that, in contemporary multi-faith Europe, the Court failed to 
consider the possibility that, for children in Dahlab‟s school, the experience of being 
taught by a woman in Islamic dress might have transmitted “positive messages about 
the equality of different religious and cultural groups”.67 And a final criticism of 
Dahlab is that the Court attached little significance to the idea that a rational 
autonomous adult, such as the applicant, should (as a general rule) be free to wear the 
clothes of her choice. 
 
The principle of personal autonomy is considered in more detail below, but 
notwithstanding these criticisms of Dahlab, the Court has continued to cite it with 
approval – most notably in the important case of Şahin v. Turkey.68 In Şahin v. 
Turkey, the applicant (Leyla Şahin) was a medical student at Istanbul University who 
objected to a circular, issued by the University‟s Vice Chancellor, prohibiting the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf (and beards) on campus. Following the introduction 
of the circular, Şahin was denied access to classes and exams on account of her 
insistence on wearing the scarf. Disciplinary proceedings were brought against her for 
participating in an unauthorised demonstration against the ban, and she was 
temporarily suspended from the University. When Şahin‟s attempts to challenge the 
circular failed in the Turkish courts, she applied to the European Court, claiming that 
the state‟s actions had unlawfully prevented her from manifesting her faith, contrary 
to Article 9 of the ECHR.
69
 
 
The Turkish government responded to Şahin‟s claims by arguing that the headscarf 
ban in universities was necessary to protect the constitutional precept of secularism.
70
 
The government pointed to the case-law of the Turkish Constitutional Court, which 
had held that the principle of secularism was, inter alia: the guarantor of democratic 
values; the meeting point of liberty and equality; a check on the state according 
preference to a particular religion; and a safeguard which protected the individual 
                                                 
65
. Id. 
66
. See D. Lyon and D. Spini, supra, n 24, 333-345. 
67
. Robin and Ovey, supra, note 60, p.310. 
68
. Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31. 
69
. She also claimed that her right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR had been breached as 
well as her rights under Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the ECHR.  The case was initially considered by the 
Chamber of the Court which found there to be no violations: see Şahin v. Turkey 41 Eur.H.R.Rep. 5 
(2005). The applicant then requested, successfully, that the case be referred to Grand Chamber (under 
Article 43 of the ECHR). Supra, n 31. 
70
. Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1992) states: “the Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular (laik) and social state based on the rule of law, respectful of human rights in a spirit 
of social peace ... .”. 
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from arbitrary interference from the state or extremist movements.
71
 Furthermore, and 
perhaps most critically, the government stressed that: 
 
“[T]he principle of secularism was a preliminary requisite for a liberal 
pluralist democracy and that there were factors  peculiar to Turkey that 
meant that the principle of secularism had assumed particular 
importance there compared to other democracies . . .  [T]he fact that 
Turkey was the only Muslim country to have adopted a liberal 
democracy . . . was explained by the fact that it had strictly applied the 
principle of secularism [and that] … protection of the secular State 
was an essential prerequisite to the application of the [European] 
Convention in Turkey.”72 (emphasis added). 
 
The Turkish government thus raised a sinister prospect for the Court to contemplate: 
that democracy itself, and the human rights protection for which it was a prerequisite, 
would be seriously eroded if the constitutional principle of secularism were not to be 
assiduously guarded.
73
   
 
Faced with such a threat, the Grand Chamber was not inclined to second guess the 
state. The Court observed that this notion of secularism − which was one of the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish state − was consistent with the values 
underpinning the Convention, as well as being in harmony with the rule of law, 
crucial for the respect of human rights, and necessary to protect democracy. Indeed, 
the Court noted that: 
 
“[T]here must be borne in mind the impact wearing [the headscarf], 
presented as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who 
choose not to wear it . . .  the issues at stake include the protection of 
the „rights and freedoms of others‟ and the „maintenance of public 
order‟.”74 
 
The European Court therefore held that because the headscarf had taken on a 
“political significance” in recent years, the restrictions imposed on those wishing to 
wear it were justified by “a pressing social need”.75 The Strasbourg judges were 
concerned about the threat of “extremist political movements” that might seek “to 
impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of society 
founded on religious precepts.”76 Accordingly, it was legitimate for the state to adopt 
a stance against such movements, and the headscarf regulations had to be viewed in 
this context as a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aim of preserving 
pluralism in the University.
77
 It was also understandable that the University 
                                                 
71
. Judgment of 7 March 1989, quoted at para.113, supra, n 31.  
72
. Şahin v. Turkey 41 Eur.H.R.Rep. 5, para.91 (2005) (Chamber). The Turkish government reiterated 
the arguments that it had put before the Chamber at the Grand Chamber hearing. 
73
. See McGoldrick, supra, n 7, p.149. 
74
. Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31, para.115, quoting paras 107-9 of the Chamber judgment.  
75
. Id. 
76
. Id. 
77
. Id, quoting paras 108-9 of the Chamber judgment. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Refah 
Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey 37 Eur.H.R.Rep.1 (G.C.) (2003), where a ban on a political party 
elected to government, whose members had criticised democracy and called for the introduction of 
sharia law, did not breach Art.11 of the ECHR. In Refah Partisi, the Court stated (para.92) that the 
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authorities should wish to maintain the secular nature of the institution and thus 
“consider it contrary to such values to allow religious attire, including the Islamic 
headscarf, to be worn”.78 Crucially, in matters of religion, the state was entitled to a 
margin of appreciation. The Court thus held that:   
 
“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the education 
community the university authorities [were] in principle better placed 
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions or the 
requirements of a particular course . . . [and that] Article 9 [did] not 
always confer a right to behave in a manner governed by religious 
belief and [did] not confer on people who [did] so the right to disregard 
rules that have proved to be justified.”79 
 
It should be noted that in Şahin there was no suggestion that the applicant herself 
posed a threat to the values of secularism, nor was there any evidence that the Islamic 
headscarf had provoked disorderly conduct or caused disruption to the everyday life 
of the University.
80
 Nonetheless, by a majority of sixteen votes to one, the Grand 
Chamber concluded that the measures were a proportionate interference with Şahin‟s 
Article 9 rights.
81
 The Court therefore accepted the state‟s claim that this fact-
insensitive law was, in essence, necessary to protect the nation‟s secular values, as 
well as being crucial for the survival of Turkish democracy.
82
 
 
In Şahin the Court implicitly recognised that secular values lie at the heart of 
contemporary human rights norms. However, suggestions of such a link may create 
particular problems for Muslims, who tend to be wary of the influence of secularism, 
particularly in areas of public life.
83
 In examining the challenge of accommodating 
Islamic dress under the ECHR, it will be argued that those responsible for the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the ECHR face significant challenges in at least two 
areas. First, they have the invidious task of balancing the seemingly incompatible 
principles of secularism and freedom of religion within the parameters of 
contemporary human rights norms. And secondly, they must reconcile the principle of 
personal autonomy with state sanctioned curbs on religious dress. 
 
 
3. The ‘challenge’ of Islamic dress and the ECHR 
 
(i) Secularism, religion and contemporary human rights norms 
 
                                                                                                                                            
prohibition of the headscarf may be legitimate if necessary for the protection of public order, or for the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
78
. Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31, para.116. 
79
. Id, at para.121. 
80
. Id, at para.8 of Judge Tulkens‟s dissent.   
81
. There was found to be no breach of her right to education under Article 2 of Protocol 1, at paras 
152-162, or of Articles 8, 10 or 14, at paras 163-166: supra, n 31. 
82
. See McGoldrick, supra, n 7, at pp.250-251. 
83
. See Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin, European Muslims and the secular state (Ashgate, 
2005). 
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Although human rights norms have been doubtlessly influenced by various religious 
traditions,
84
 few would deny that contemporary principles of human rights are 
“essentially „secular‟ in nature”.85  Modern human rights are, at root, a product of the 
“shift from a religious to a secular culture at the time of the Enlightenment in 
eighteenth-century Europe”.86 As the historian, Yehoshua Ariell has observed: 
 
“The secular character of the normative system embodied in human 
rights doctrine is essential to its comprehension. All its premises, 
values, concepts and purposes relate to the homocentric world and to 
ways of thought freed from transcendentalist premises and from the 
jurisdiction of religious authority. And so, the development of the 
doctrine of human rights is inseverably connected to the process of 
secularisation of Western society.”87 (emphasis added). 
 
The concept of secularism is itself far from straightforward but, in very broad terms, it 
can be seen as an attempt to separate religion and state, so that the former becomes a 
private matter and the latter refrains from coercion in the field of belief or 
conscience.
88
 Ahdar and Leigh regard secularism as “a philosophy obliging the state 
to refrain from adopting and imposing any established beliefs”, and they maintain it 
rests on the assumption that the foundation of the state is “a non-established secular 
order [which is] equally respectful of religionists and non-religionists alike”.89 The 
European Court of Human Rights has endorsed this view of the state‟s role as: 
 
“[T]he neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs [and it has also emphasised that] the State‟s 
duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on 
the State‟s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways 
those beliefs are expressed.”90 
 
The shift of focus embodied in secularism, from the transcendental and divine to the 
human centred and rational, is a characteristic of contemporary human rights norms. 
Ironically, however, the religious beliefs and practices that find themselves protected 
in such instruments do invest authority in the divine and the transcendental − and they 
may even subscribe to beliefs that are seemingly incompatible with a secular vision of 
society. A case in point is the rejection by many Muslims of the distinction that 
secularism draws between and „private‟ and „public‟ manifestation of one‟s religion 
                                                 
84
. On the influence of faiths such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism on international human rights law 
see Mark Janus and Carolyn Evans (eds) Religion and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1999).  
85. Malcolm Evans “Religion law and human rights: locating the debate”, in Edge and Harvey (eds) 
supra, n 49, p.182. 
86. Frances Raday, “Culture, Religion and Gender” (2003) 4 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 663. 
87
. Yehoshua Ariell, “The Theory of Human Rights, its Origin and Impact on Modern Society” in 
Daniel Gutwein and Menachem Mautner (eds) Law and History 25, cited in Raday, supra, n 86, p.663.  
88
. Benjamin Berger, “The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal State”, 
(2002) 39 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 49. 
89
. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (OUP, 2005) p.74. 
90
. Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31, para.107. See also Hassan and Chaush v. Bulgaria 30 Eur.H.R.Rep. 
50, para.78 (2000) and Serif v. Greece 31 Eur.H.R.Rep. 20, para.57 (2001). 
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or belief.
91
 What has been described as “Islamic totalism”, whereby Islam is seen as 
embracing all aspects of life, including the social, economic, legal and political 
spheres,
92
 rests uneasily with the secular model which effectively views religion as 
merely having a private (rather than a public) dimension.
93
 It is thus the case that not 
all religious believers necessarily buy into the secular vision of society that liberalism 
typically regards as being so crucial for the protection of all human rights (including 
freedom of religion). It is this central paradox − that contemporary human rights 
norms are essentially secular in nature, yet may also protect one‟s right to behave in 
ways that are incompatible with secular principles − which renders the issue of 
religious dress so problematic within the framework of the ECHR. Furthermore, it 
provides the basis for several related ironies and contradictions − one of which is the 
challenge of ensuring that a proper balance is struck between the personal autonomy 
of believers and the legitimate power of the state in relation to the imposition of 
restrictions on religious dress. 
 
 
(ii) Personal autonomy and religious dress. 
 
Strongly connected with the principle of secularism in liberal thought is the notion of 
individual autonomy − the idea that “freedom of will and a capacity for self directed 
action within a social environment are the most important of human characteristics”.94  
If, for example, a state were to impose an official orthodoxy on its critics in respect of 
religion, this would clearly run counter to the liberal view that individuals are 
autonomous agents who should be allowed to choose their own life paths. For Joseph 
Raz “[t]he ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some 
degree, their own destiny”, in contrast to “a life of coerced choices” or “a life of no 
choices.”95 The decision to subscribe to a particular religion (and its related practices, 
including its dress codes) is but one choice available to rational autonomous 
individuals, and the state‟s role is to provide a neutral framework within which such a 
choice may be exercised.  A necessary concomitant of a commitment to personal 
autonomy is some form of value pluralism.  For one to be free to exercise a 
meaningful choice there must be a plurality of life paths from which one is able to 
choose. As Raz reasons: “[i]f all the choices in life are like the choice between two 
identical-looking cherries from a fruit bowl, then that life is not autonomous”.96 
Indeed, a necessary consequence of autonomy is that people will pursue a variety of 
paths.  Inevitably these paths will sometimes conflict and yet still be viewed as 
valuable, because they derive from the free choices of rational agents.
97
 
                                                 
91
. Other examples of religious beliefs that are difficult to reconcile with a secular vision of society 
include religious doctrines that discriminate against certain groups, such as children born out of 
wedlock or gays and lesbians. 
92. William Shepherd, “Islam and Ideology: Toward a Typology” (1987) 19 International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 327. 
93. See, generally, David Harte, “Defining the Legal Boundaries of Orthodoxy for Public and Private 
Religion in England”, in Richard O‟Dair and Andrew Lewis (eds) Law and Religion (OUP, 2001), 
pp.471-496. 
94
. David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, 2002) p.9. 
95
. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1986) pp.369–71. See also Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) p.272; and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Clarendon Press, 1999) pp.17-22. 
96
. Raz, id, pp.398–9.  
97
. Id, pp.395– 9.  
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There is evidence of this approach in the jurisprudence of the European Court.
98
 Yet 
the liberal discourse of autonomy is difficult to square with why some people adopt a 
particular faith and related lifestyle. Very often a believer‟s adherence to a particular 
religious practice is not the result of a process of rational decision making, whereby a 
choice is made between various competing life paths.
99
 Instead, from the believer‟s 
perspective it may instead be a matter of obedience to the “will of God”.100 For 
example, Muslim women of all ages doubtlessly wear the hijab for a wide variety of 
reasons, but for some (at the very least) it is because of their belief that such dress is 
required by a divine obligation. After all, the Qur‟an, believed by Muslims to be the 
will of God revealed through his prophet Mohammed, commands: 
 
“And tell believing women that they should lower their glances, guard 
their private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is 
acceptable] to reveal; they should let their headscarves fall to cover 
their necklines and not reveal their charms except to their husbands, 
their fathers, their husbands‟ fathers, their sons …101 
 
and 
 
Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make 
their outer garments hang low over them so as to be recognised and not 
insulted.”102 
 
The liberal language of autonomy, so central to human rights doctrine, may thus not 
be adequate to explain the obligation on the wearer of hijab. As Anastasia Vakulanko 
asserts − “the paradigm of choice may not be an adequate tool to comprehend 
religiousness … [t]he veiled subject is not quite graspable by the classic Western 
liberal notions of autonomy and choice …”. 103  
 
It is perhaps significant that many liberals have assumed that compliance with a 
religious duty is irreconcilable with the paradigm of choice: 
 
“Women who contend that the veil is part of religious doctrine, a 
divine edict, or a form of ethical practice . . . are usually judged to be 
victims of false consciousness, mired in a traditionalism that leads 
them to mistakenly internalize the opinions of misogynist jurists whom 
                                                 
98
. See Serif v. Greece, supra, n 90, para.53, and Şahin v. Turkey, supra, n 31, para.107. 
99
. See Benjamin. Beit-Hallahmi and Michael Argyle, The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief 
and Experience (Taylor and Francis, 1997) pp.97-113. 
100. For example the literal meaning of “Islam” is “surrender [to the will of God]”: Karen Armstrong, 
The Battle for God, (Harper Collins, 2000) p.375. Some commentators have argued that the whole 
notion of individual rights sits uneasily with some religious cultures. For example, the Islamic concept 
of ummah or community raises potential difficulties for Muslims bringing individual human rights 
claims. See Anthony Bradney, “Law and Religion in Great Britain at the End of the Second Christian 
Millennium” in Edge and Harvey (eds) supra, n 49, pp.24-6. 
101
. The Light  24:31 (M. A. S. Abdel Haleem trans: OUP, 2004). 
102
. The Clans  33:59 (M. A. S. Abdel Haleem trans: OUP, 2004). 
103. Anastasia Vakulenko, “Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Critique of Current 
Trends” (2007) 7(4) Human Rights Law Review 717, 729. 
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they should resist.  Such is the fate that must befall the veil in a secular 
imaginary.”104 
 
It may be that it is because of these factors that the courts have accorded 
comparatively little weight to principles of autonomy when hearing claims involving 
the right to wear religious dress.  In Şahin the Grand Chamber, citing with approval 
the view of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Chamber of the European Court, 
reiterated that “in the Turkish context” the Islamic headscarf was “presented as a 
compulsory religious duty”, and its impact had to be born in mind on those who 
“[chose] not to wear it”.105 The autonomy based arguments of those claiming the 
“right” were therefore seriously undermined. Only the dissenting judge, Judge 
Tulkens, made reference to the autonomous choice of the applicant: 
 
“The applicant, a young adult university student said – and there is 
nothing to suggest that she was not telling the truth – that she wore the 
headscarf of her own free will. . .  I fail to see how the principle of 
sexual equality can justify prohibiting a woman from following a 
practice which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, she must be 
taken to have freely adopted . . . Paternalism of this sort runs counter 
to the case law of the Court, which has developed a real right to 
personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8.”106 (emphasis added).  
 
This doctrinal uncertainty – and the issue of whether the exercise of autonomy can be 
a valid argument for a woman claiming the right to wear the headscarf because of a 
divine obligation − is one of the components reflected in the widened margin of 
appreciation granted to states when dealing with religious dress. This is evident when 
comparing the Court‟s approach to cases brought under the right to respect for a 
private life (Article 8 ECHR) in which, as Judge Tulkens observed in Şahin, the 
principle of autonomy has been fully recognised.
107
 In cases involving the “most 
intimate aspect of private life”, such as those concerning sexual orientation and 
gender identity, the Court has found that there have to “exist particularly serious 
reasons before interferences by public authorities [can] be legitimate”.108  
Consequently the margin of appreciation afforded in such cases to states has been 
very narrow. For example, in Goodwin v. UK, which concerned the right to legal 
recognition of change in gender, the Court stated that: 
 
“Under Article 8 of the Convention … where the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of each 
individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings.”109  
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. Mahmood, supra, n 53, at 343–4. 
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. Id, para. 12 of Judge Tulkens‟ dissenting judgment.   
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The language of autonomy is one which the European Court readily understands. Its 
invocation clearly has the effect of successfully narrowing the margin of appreciation 
that the Court is prepared to grant, and consequently increasing protection for 
claimants. Yet, in comparison with Article 8, the use of the language of autonomy to 
under-gird arguments relating to religious practice (under Article 9), tends to be much 
less well received or accepted by the Court. This contrast perhaps illustrates the 
caution that is generally associated with Convention jurisprudence in respect of 
Article 9 of the ECHR.
110
 Moreover, the conservative way in which Article 9 has been 
interpreted stands in marked contrast to the Court‟s approach to what it considers to 
be values that are particularly worthy of protection, such as those associated with the 
principle of democracy. 
 
 
4. Democracy and religious dress 
(i) The prioritization of rights associated with democracy 
As is the case with autonomy, democracy is an essential prerequisite for a 
contemporary liberal state
111
 − and like autonomy, the European Court has embraced 
the principle of political democracy.
112
  For example, in United Communist Party of 
Turkey v. Turkey, the Court stated that democracy appeared “to be the only political 
model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible 
with it.”113 Rights that are considered to be essential for the preservation of an 
effective democratic polity are jealously guarded by the Court. Of particular 
importance are key principles such as freedom of political and journalistic expression, 
as guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR.
114
 Yet, where the very same Article is 
invoked in support of religious expression, a significantly lower level of protection is 
afforded. The starkness of the distinction is well illustrated by comparing the 
outwardly similar cases of VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland
115
 (which 
concerned a blanket ban on the broadcasting of political advertising) and Murphy v. 
Ireland
116
 (which concerned a similar ban on religious advertising). The ban in VgT 
was designed to prevent wealthy organisations from buying up large slots of airtime, 
and dominating the airwaves with their own political messages. Even though VgT, a 
small charitable group campaigning against factory farming, was patently not such an 
organisation, the Court held it was still caught by the ban, on the basis that this ban 
constituted a disproportionate interference with its Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
rights. Yet in contrast, in Murphy, where the Court accepted that a radio advert for a 
public talk to be given by a small evangelical Christian group was only “innocuous 
                                                 
110
. See Peter Cumper, “Freedom of Religion and Belief”, in David Harris, Michael O‟Boyle, Colin 
Warbrick, Ed Bates and Carla Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2nd 
edn, 2008) chapter 10 (forthcoming). 
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and … informational”,117 there was no violation of Article 10. In reaching this 
conclusion the Court expressly distinguished VgT from Murphy and reasoned that, in 
the latter case, the content of the expression required that a greater margin of 
appreciation be granted to the state: 
“[Whilst there was] little scope  . . . for restrictions on political speech 
or on debate of questions of public interest . . . a wider margin of 
appreciation [was] generally available . . . when regulating freedom of 
expression in areas liable to offend intimate personal convictions 
within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion . . . [and that what 
is] … likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular 
religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from 
place to place, especially in an era characterised by an ever growing 
array of faiths and denominations.”118 
 
The rationale behind this difference of approach appears to lie in the relative 
instrumental value of the content of the expression in question.
119
 For example, the 
European Court has stated on numerous occasions that “freedom of political debate is 
at the very core of the concept of democratic society which prevails throughout the 
Convention.”120 Thus, given that freedom of political speech is vital to the democratic 
process, the goal of securing effective representative democracy is best served by 
granting strong protection to “political” expression.   
 
In contrast, however, the instrumental value of religious expression and its 
manifestation is less obvious.  It is not vital for the protection of democracy, because 
it apparently produces less in the way of overall societal benefit.  Instead, it primarily 
benefits the individual who engages in his/her religious activity.  As Andrew Geddis 
explains, it is   
 
“[B]ecause religious expression is not thought to generate as great an 
externalised benefit for society as a whole when compared to political 
expression that there is less of a „thumb on the scale‟ when it comes to 
weighing the value of the speech against the possible harms it may 
engender”.121 
 
The distinction between rights regarded as being beneficial to democracy and those 
seen as being primarily of benefit for an individual right‟s holder is emphasised, yet 
further, in the wider case law of Article 9 of the ECHR. A comparison may be drawn 
in this context between the „religious dress cases‟, and a series of recent cases 
concerning the refusal of states to permit the registration of religious organisations.  
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For example, in the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia,
122
 the Moscow 
authorities refused to grant legal recognition to the applicant organisation, while the 
Salvation Army claimed a breach of Articles 9 and 11 (the right to peaceful assembly 
and association) in tandem.
123
 In giving judgment the European Court noted that 
religious communities traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, and 
accordingly it reasoned that Article 9 had to be interpreted in the light of Article 11.
124
 
In a revealing passage the Court stated that: 
 
“While in the context of Article 11 the Court has often referred to the 
essential role played by political parties in ensuring pluralism and 
democracy, associations formed for other purposes, including those 
proclaiming or teaching religion, are also important to the proper 
functioning of democracy. For pluralism is also built on the genuine 
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural 
traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, 
literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts. The harmonious 
interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for 
achieving social cohesion. It is only natural that, where a civil society 
functions in a healthy manner, the participation of citizens in the 
democratic process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to 
associations in which they may integrate with each other and pursue 
common objectives collectively.”125 (emphasis added). 
 
This hitching of Article 9 to Article 11 seems to have resulted in the European Court 
adopting a higher level of scrutiny as to the grounds on which the state can restrict 
freedom of religion or belief. Thus, the extremely wide margin of appreciation that 
the Court so readily granted in respect of Article 9 in Şahin was dramatically 
narrowed: 
“The exceptions to the rule of freedom of association are to be 
construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can 
justify restrictions on that freedom. In determining whether a necessity 
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of these Convention provisions 
exists, the States have only a limited margin of appreciation, which 
goes hand in hand with rigorous European supervision …”.126 
(emphasis added). 
As a result the Court held that the actions of the Russian authorities were not justified, 
and there was a violation of Article 11 of the Convention “read in the light of Article 
9”.127 Article 11 is thus viewed as being of vital importance to the “proper functioning 
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of democracy”.128 Indeed, the European Court sees clear benefits deriving from 
popular participation in civic associations and societies whose existence is central to 
democratic pluralist society, even where such groups are not in themselves directly 
contributing to democracy. The conjoining of the religious with the associative right 
seems, therefore, to have been an important component in the success of the Salvation 
Army before the Court.
129
 Accordingly, the canonical position of democracy under 
the ECHR means that aspects of rights regarded as being vital for its protection − 
even if only tangentially so
130
 − receive enhanced protection from the Court. But 
where an applicant merely wishes to invoke Article 9 in support of his/her form of 
religious dress, the absence of a clear nexus with the democratic process apparently 
condemns him/her to almost certain defeat at the hands of the state, which enjoys a 
wide margin of appreciation. 
 
 
(ii) Article 9, democracy and ‘slippery slopes’ 
 
In Şahin, as noted above, when presented with the cataclysmic possibility of the 
future downfall of democracy and human rights protection in Turkey, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court accorded the state a wide margin of appreciation. 
This essentially proved to be the death knell for the applicant‟s claim. In accepting 
that individuals may legitimately be prevented from wearing items of clothing, not 
because of anything inherently objectionable about the dress per se, but on account of 
the risk of future consequences associated with it (i.e., the threat to democracy posed 
by an inexorable slide toward extremism), the Court constructed a version of the 
“slippery slope” argument. Frederick Schauer has characterised such arguments as 
leading to a situation where: “a particular act, seemingly innocuous when taken in 
isolation … may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly pernicious 
events”.131 
 
Whilst slippery slope arguments often underpin many policy decisions in public life, 
they are undoubtedly dangerous, particularly in the field of fundamental human rights.  
They tend to rely, by definition, not on any actual harm stemming from conduct, but 
are rather based on the possibility of some (often unquantifiable) anticipated future 
harm.  As Schauer points out: 
 
“[A] . . . slippery slope argument depends for its persuasiveness upon 
temporally and spatially contingent empirical facts rather than (or in 
addition to) simple logical interference … slippery slope claims 
deserve to be viewed sceptically, and the proponent of such a claim 
must be expected to provide the necessary empirical support. This 
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empirical support provides the supplement necessary to complete the 
structure of a slippery slope argument.”132  
 
However, as we have seen, the European Court has not insisted upon such evidence in 
religious dress cases.  The need for evidence has been submerged in the deep ocean of 
the margin of appreciation, so readily afforded by the Court to the state. As the 
dissenting judge in Şahin, Judge Tulkens, commented: 
 
“Only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt 
– not mere worries or fears – are capable of satisfying that requirement 
and justifying interference with a right guaranteed by the Convention 
… [m]ere affirmations do not suffice: they must be supported by 
concrete examples. Such examples do not appear to have been 
forthcoming in [this] case.”133 
 
This is a discouraging picture for anyone who wishes to invoke the ECHR and is 
hoping to win the right to wear the religious dress of their choice. Furthermore, such 
an applicant‟s position is even worse when we again compare the European Court‟s 
approach to the hierarchy of rights. Cases such as Gündüz v Turkey
134
 make it clear 
that, even within the general parameters of religious freedom, certain forms of this 
right (eg., participation in public debate or in political associations) are granted higher 
levels of protection than others. 
 
In Gündüz v Turkey, the applicant (Müslüm Gündüz), a member of an Islamic 
religious sect, took part in a live televised debate in which he advocated the 
introduction of sharia law, as well as vehemently criticising democracy and 
secularism. Convicted of incitement to religious hatred, he was sentenced to two years 
imprisonment and a fine by the Turkish courts. Gündüz‟s claim, that these curbs had 
(inter alia) unfairly restricted his freedom of expression, was upheld by the European 
Court, which found that there had been a violation of Article 10 by the Turkish 
state.
135
 The Court found it relevant that there had been considerable public interest in 
the applicant‟s sect,136 and that the programme in which the applicant had taken part 
had been designed to provoke debate and “even an argument”.137 Some of the 
applicant‟s comments may have been offensive but, because they were made orally 
during a live television broadcast, there had been “no possibility of [the applicant] 
reformulating, refining or retracting them before they were made public”. The Court 
held that, in these circumstances, it was particularly significant that the applicant had 
been “actively participating in a lively public discussion”.138 On the question of his 
advocacy of sharia, the Court reiterated its opinion that sharia law was not compatible 
with the underlying values of the Convention.
139
 However, the mere fact one spoke in 
defence of sharia, without calling for violence to establish it, could not be regarded as 
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“hate speech”, especially in the context of a television programme in which other 
counter-balancing views had been put forward.
140
 Thus, the Court concluded that 
there was a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR because Gündüz‟s views “were 
expressed in the course of a pluralistic debate in which [he] was actively taking 
part.”141  
 
As has been well documented elsewhere, the question of whether democracy is 
compatible with sharia law is a problematic and emotive one.
142
 Thus, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Court confined itself to making reference to its earlier decision in 
Refah Partisi, in which it had found that the banning of a political party, whose 
members had (inter alia) called for jihad and advocated the introduction of sharia, did 
not breach Article 11 of the ECHR.
143
 Refah had been elected as the largest party in 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1995, so there was deemed to be a real 
prospect of it “seizing political power” and putting its policies into practice. However, 
the Court in Gündüz considered that “such a situation [was] hardly comparable with 
the one in issue,”144 and distinguished Refah Partisi on the ground that in Gündüz the 
applicant was only engaging in “pluralistic debate” – exactly the sort of activity 
which the Court maintains is a foundation of a democratic society, and is thereby vital 
for the effective protection of human rights.   
 
So where does this leave an applicant like Şahin, who is seeking to challenge a state‟s 
restriction on the Islamic headscarf in Turkey? Unlike Gündüz, the applicant in Şahin 
was not actively advocating anything. In contrast, she was merely manifesting her 
belief through her clothing and was therefore, by that very same token, not engaged in 
“pluralistic debate”. Her activity did not fit within the template of an active citizen, 
engaged in civic discourse, in a pluralist democratic society. If we return to the 
slippery slopes metaphor, Müslüm Gündüz would appear to be much further down the 
slope than Leyla Şahin. But it would appear that there exists more than one slope. The 
slope envisaged when the applicant is engaged in “pluralistic debate” is less steeply 
inclined (or is less slippery, perhaps) than that which is envisaged when the applicant 
is manifesting his/her religious belief through dress. Hence the “debater” seems to be 
permitted to descend much further down the incline before his/her behaviour can be 
legitimately proscribed.
145
 After all, “pluralistic debate” is a form of expression that 
the Court regards as being generally beneficial.
146
 However, wearing the headscarf is 
not afforded the benefit of such a presumption. On the contrary, it is often viewed as 
being little more than a strange manifestation of an irrational belief, with no 
redeeming social utility to ameliorate the perilous angle of its own slippery slope.  
  
The European Court‟s judgment in Şahin must of course be seen in the context of the 
contemporary political challenges facing those governing Turkey. That said, it has, 
nonetheless, led to a situation where a Muslim woman in (at least some parts of) 
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Europe needs only wear the Islamic headscarf before the state can legitimately restrict 
her freedom on the basis of some future event(s) that might ensue. Yet, as noted 
above, in regard to the “pluralistic debater” – even where the topic is religion, and 
s/he actually advocates the overthrow of the entire system − s/he is likely to obtain the 
Court‟s protection unless there is a real chance s/he could actually put into practice 
what is preached. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in having to interpret Article 9 of the ECHR in 
a continent that is the home of numerous religions and equivalent systems of belief, 
has an undeniably formidable task. Yet its success in this regard is questionable, not 
least because its judges have tended to give the impression that religion − or rather the 
manifestation of religious belief through symbols and dress − is not really that 
important in contemporary Europe. Of course the Court has recognised that religion is 
a socially useful tool when it fosters democratic interests – such as when it is claimed 
in tandem with the right to association
147
 or is part of a “pluralistic debate”148 – but 
that otherwise its influence on public life should (as far as possible) be limited or 
discouraged. 
 
In this context it is perhaps worth recalling that when the ECHR was drafted in post 
war Europe, the continent‟s dominant religion (Christianity) was generally seen as 
being a positive social force, because it was a strong bulwark against Communism. 
Today, however, radical Islam rather than Communism is seen by many as posing a 
serious threat to liberal European values.
149
 Thus, rather than guarding against the 
threat to freedom, religion (or more specifically Islam) is viewed by some as 
positively contributing to it. Consequently, as Gareth Davies notes: 
  
“It seems that Europeans, to a very large extent are not prepared to afford 
[Islam or its stricter adherents] the same respect that they would to milder or 
more familiar beliefs.  They remind them too forcefully, perhaps, of views that 
this continent has itself barely left behind”.150  
 
Claims of „Islamaphobia‟,151 and a perception that the West is guilty of applying 
“double standards” where Islam is concerned,152 has evidently fuelled the 
disenchantment of many young Muslims in parts of Europe with secular liberal 
values. Yet, ironically, the European Court‟s ruling in Şahin was predicated on the 
basis of the need to protect democracy in Turkey from religious extremism. When the 
Court next considers the issue of religious dress, it is to be hoped that it will interpret 
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Article 9 more robustly than was the case in Şahin. The consequences of a failure to 
do so should not be ignored. The perception that the Court does not take religion 
seriously, could foster bitterness and might, paradoxically, push many within 
Europe‟s Muslim communities into the arms of radical Islamists − the very groups 
whose values the Court sought to guard against in Şahin.  
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